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Abstract 
This paper surveys the growth and various phases of and influences on the 
concept of democracy in the Islamic political thought of the last two 
centuries. Among the thinkers covered in the survey are Rifa'a Tahtawi 
(1801-73), Khairuddin at-Tunis (1810-99), Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani 
(1838-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi 
(1849-1903), Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Hasan al-Banna (1904-49), Ali 
Abd Ar-Raziq (1888-1966), Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), Sa'id Hawwa, and 
Malik Bennabi (1905-73). Reference is made to the influence of Sayyid 
Mawdudi (1903-79), on the thought of Sayyid Qutb. The paper traces also 
the bearing of Bennabi's thought on Rachid Ghannouchi and on the 
Islamic movements of our times. 
------------------------------------------ 
Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the 
modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept 
of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety 
of social and political developments.
[1] The discussion of democracy in 
Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa'a Tahtawi,
[2] the father 
of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,
[3] who shortly after his 
return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila 
Talkhis Bariz, in 1834. The book summahrized his observations of the 
manners and customs of the modern French,
[4] and praised the concept of 
democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and 
reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.
[5] 
Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his 
readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political 
pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed 
in the Islamic experience:    2
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, 
provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same 
would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading 
administrators, who endeavor to interpret and apply rules and provisions 
in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers 
are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end 
serve one purpose: good administration and justice.
[6]  
 
One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin 
At-Tunisi (1810-99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in 
Tunisia, who, in 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book 
entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to 
Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in 
tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While 
appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means 
in order to improve the status of the community and develop its civility, he 
warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of 
other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, 
inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or 
disregarded. Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which 
he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of 
civilizations.
[7] 
 
Ghannouchi believes that neither Khairuddin nor any of the Islamic 
scholars of his time had intended to cast doubt on Islam or introduce 
changes to it. They only sought to understand Islam better and explore 
new means and methods to implement it, relying on the explanations of 
both ancient and contemporary scholars. They sought to legitimize 
borrowing from the West on the basis that ' . . . wisdom (or knowledge) is 
a believer's long-cherished objective', that ' . . . religion has been revealed 
for the benefit of the creation', and that ' . . . [the] Shari’ah and the vital 
interests of the community are fully compatible'.
[8] To implement his 
reform plan, Khairuddin established the As-Sadiqiyah School for teaching 
modern arts and sciences within an Islamic framework. The purpose of the 
School, according to the founding declaration, was: 'To teach the Qur'an, 
writing and useful knowledge, i.e. juridical sciences, foreign languages, 
and the rational sciences that might be of use to Muslims being at the same 
time not contrary to the faith. The professors must inculcate in the students 
love of the faith by showing them its beauties and excellence, in telling 
them the deeds of the Prophet, the miracles accomplished by him, the 
virtues of the holy men . . .'
[9] Khairuddin At-Tunisi believed that ' . . . 
kindling the Ummahh's potential liberty through the adoption of sound   3
administrative procedures and enabling it to have a say in political affairs, 
would put it on a faster track toward civilization, would limit the rule of 
despotism, and would stop the influx of European civilization that is 
sweeping everything along its path.'
[10] 
 
In his search for the causes of decline in the Muslim world, Jamal ad-Din 
Al-Afghani (1838-97) diagnosed that it was due to the absence of 'adl 
(justice) and shura (council) and non-adherence by the government to the 
constitution.
[11] 
 
One of his main demands was that the people should be allowed to assume 
their political and social rule by participating in governing through shura 
and elections.
[12] In an article entitled 'The Despotic Government', 
published in Misr on 14 February 1879, Al-Afghani attributed the decline 
to despotism which is the reason why thinkers in the Eastern (Muslim) 
countries could not enlighten the public about the essence and virtues of 
the 'republican government'. 'For those governed by it', he stresses, 'it is a 
source of happiness and pride'. He goes further, to insist that ' . . . those 
governed by a republican form of government, alone deserve to be called 
human; for a true human being is only subdued by a true law that is based 
on the foundations of justice and that is designed to govern man's moves, 
actions, transactions and relations with others in a manner that elevates 
him to the pinnacle of true happiness.'
[13] To Al-Afghani, a republican 
government is a 'restricted government' that is accountable to the public, 
and that is thus the antithesis of the absolutist one. It is a government that 
consults the governed, relieves them of the burdens laid upon them by 
despotic governments and lifts them from the state of decay to the first 
level of perfection.
[14] 
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) believed that Islam's relationship with the 
modern age was the most crucial issue that Islamic communities needed to 
deal with. In an attempt to reconcile Islamic ideas with Western ones, he 
suggested that maslaha (interest) in Islamic thought corresponded to 
manfa'a (utility) in Western thought. Similarly, he equated shura with 
democracy and ijma' with consensus. Addressing the question of authority, 
Abduh denied the existence of a theocracy in Islam and insisted that the 
authority of the hakim (governor) or that of the qadi (judge) or that of the 
mufti was civil. He strongly believed that Ijtihad should be revived 
because ' . . . emerging priorities and problems, which are new to the 
Islamic thought, need to be addressed'.
[15] He was a proponent of the 
parliamentary system and defended pluralism, refuting claims that it 
would undermine the unity of the ummahh. He argued that European   4
nations were not divided by it. 'The reason', he concludes, 'is that their 
objective is the same. What varies is the method they pursue toward 
accomplishing it'.
[16] 
Abdurrahman Al-Kawakibi (1849-1903) wrote two books on the subject, 
Taba'i' Al- Istibdad (The Characteristics of Tyranny) and Umm Al-Qura 
(The Mother of Villages). The first is dedicated to defining despotism and 
explaining the various forms it may take, with much of the discussion 
focusing on political despotism. The relationship between religion and 
despotism and what he calls the 'inseparable tie' between politics and 
religion are also discussed. While stressing that Islam as a religion is not 
responsible for the forms of despotic government that have emerged and 
reigned in its name, Al-Kawakibi concludes that 'Allah, the omni wise, has 
intended nations to be responsible for the actions of those whom they 
choose to be governed by. When a nation fails in its duty, God causes it to 
be subdued by another nation that will govern it, just as happens in a court 
of law when a minor or an incompetent is put under the care of a curator. 
When, on the other hand, a nation matures and appreciates the value of 
liberty, it will restore its might; and this is only fair.'
[17] The entire book is 
an attempt to explain the reasons why the Muslim ummahh declined and 
became easy prey for 19th-century colonial powers. Like Al-Afghani and 
Abduh, Al-Kawakibi attributed the success of Western nations to ' . . . the 
adoption of logical and well-practiced rules that have become social duties 
in these advanced nations which are not harmed by what appears to be a 
division into parties and groups, because such a division is only over the 
methods of applying the rules and not over them.'
[18] In his other book, Al-
Kawakibi constructs a series of dialogues involving fictional characters 
whom he describes as thinkers each belonging to a known town in the 
Muslim world, all summoned to a conference organized in Makka (Umm 
al-Qura) during the pilgrimage (hajj) season to discuss the causes of 
decline of the Muslim ummahh. One character, Al-Baligh Al-Qudsi, says: 
'It seems to me that the cause of tepidity is the change in the nature of 
Islamic politics. It was parliamentary and socialist, that is perfectly 
democratic. But due to the escalation of internal feuds, after the Guided 
ones (the first four Caliphs) it was transformed into a monarchy restrained 
by the basic rules of Shari’ah, and then it became almost completely 
absolute.' Ar-Rumi says: 'The calamity has been our loss of liberty.' In 
conclusion, Al-Kawakibi stresses that progress is linked to accountability 
while regress is linked to despotism.
[19] 
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) saw that the reason for the 
backwardness of the ummah was that ' . . . the Muslims have lost the truth   5
of their religion, and this has been encouraged by bad political rulers, for 
the true Islam involves two things, acceptance of the unity of God and 
consultation in matters of State, and despotic rulers have tried to make 
Muslims forget the second by encouraging them to abandon the first.'
[20] 
He stressed that the greatest lesson the people of the Orient can learn from 
Europeans is to know what government should be like.
[21] In his book Al-
Khilafa (The Caliphate) he stresses that Islam is guidance, mercy and 
social-civic policy. About the latter, which he seems to use as a synonym 
for politics, he says: 'As for the social-civic policy, Islam has laid its 
foundations and set forth its rules, and has sanctioned the exertion of 
opinion and the pursuit of Ijtihad in matters related to it because it changes 
with time and place and develops as architecture and all other aspects of 
knowledge develop. Its foundations include that authority belongs to the 
ummah, that decision-making is through shura, that the government is a 
form of a republic, that the ruler is not favored in a court of law to the 
layman - for he is only employed to implement Shari’ah and public 
opinion, and that the purpose of this policy is to preserve religion and 
serve the interests of the public . . .'
[22]  
Nineteenth-century Islamic political thinkers, who were clearly influenced 
by European democratic thought and practice, tried to establish a 
resemblance between democracy and the Islamic concept of shura. Faced 
with a crisis of government augmented by the autocracy and corrupt 
conduct of Muslim rulers, they sought to legitimize the borrowing of 
aspects of the Western model they believed were compatible with Islam 
and capable of resolving the crisis. However, the trend changed in the 
aftermath of the First World War and following the demise of the Khilafah 
(Caliphate), whose abrogation, in 1924, shocked the Muslims in spite of 
the fact that many of them had suffered greatly at the hands of some 
Ottoman rulers. The Khilafah was an administrative legacy that for many 
centuries represented a moral shield and a political entity.
[23] The challenge 
was no longer despotism. The Muslims had already lost their symbol of 
unity, which they had been trying to reform. The European democracies, 
which provided inspiration and were greatly admired by reformists in the 
East, had colonized much of the Arab world, dividing its territories among 
them as booties. The Western colonizers' endeavors to westernize the 
Muslims were viewed as a serious threat to the Arab-Islamic identity, and, 
thus, liberating Muslim lands from colonialism became a priority. Hence, 
one for revival replaced the call for reform. 
During this period, Rashid Rida, Abduh's disciple, published the Al-Manar 
Journal that attracted a readership of Islamic intellectuals who shared   6
Rida's specific additions to the thoughts of his masters Al-Afghani and 
Abduh, namely the condemnation of innovations in doctrine and worship 
and the acceptance of the rights of reason and public welfare in matters of 
social morality. A young man who frequented Rida's circle and regularly 
read his Journal, then attempted to carry it on after Rida's death. His name 
was Hasan Al-Banna (1904-49).
[24]  Trained by his father Ahmad Al-
Banna, a graduate of Al-Azhar University and author of an encyclopedia 
of Hadith and Islamic Jurisprudence, young Hasan grew up to become the 
founder of the largest and first international Islamic movement in modern 
times, the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood).  
Established as a study circle, known as Madrasat at-Tahdhib (The School 
of Refinement), in 1928 in the Egyptian port city of Al-Isma'iliyyah - the 
headquarters of the Suez Canal Company and the British forces in Egypt - 
the group grew rapidly and spread to other parts of the country within a 
short period of time. Its growth accelerated by the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty and the Arab Revolt in Palestine against the British Mandate and 
Zionist colonization; the movement quickly transformed itself into a 
political entity. By 1939 a series of rasa'il (messages or articles), mostly 
authored by Al-Banna, were circulated explaining the Ikhwan's mission, 
clarifying its ideas and underlining its method.
[25]  In the first of these 
articles, entitled Bayn al-Ams wa'l-Yawm (Between Yesterday and Today), 
Hasan Al-Banna diagnosed the situation in the Muslim world as follows: 
European power expanded, thanks to discoveries, expeditions, and travels 
to far and distant lands as far as many of the remote Islamic countries like 
India, as well as some of the neighboring Islamic provinces. Europe began 
to work earnestly at dismembering the powerful and far-flung Islamic state 
proposing numerous plans toward this end, referring to them at times as 
'the Eastern question' and at others as 'dividing up the inheritance of the 
Sick Man of Europe'. Every state began to seize any opportunity as it 
arose, adopting the flimsiest of excuses to attack the peaceful yet careless 
Islamic state, and to reduce its periphery or demolish parts of its integral 
fabric. This onslaught continued over a long period of time, during which 
the Ottoman Empire was stripped of much of its Islamic territory that then 
fell under European domination, e.g., Morocco and North Africa. Many 
non-Islamic areas previously under Ottoman rule became independent 
during this time, e.g., Greece and the Balkan States. The final round of this 
struggle was the First World War, from 1914 to 1918, which ended in the 
defeat of Turkey and her allies, providing a perfect opportunity for the 
strongest nations of Europe, (England and France, and under their 
patronage, Italy). They laid their hands on the huge legacy left behind by   7
the Islamic nations, imposing their rule over them under the various titles 
of occupation, colonialism, trusteeship or mandate dividing them up in the 
following manner: North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis) became 
French colonies lying in between a zone of international influence in 
Tangier and a Spanish colony in the Rif; Tripoli and Barca became Italian 
colonies in which Italy did not wish a single trace of Islam to remain. She 
forced Italian citizenship upon the people giving it the name of 'South 
Italy' and filling it with thousands of hungry families and wild beasts in 
human form (Italian outcasts); Egypt and the Sudan fell under English 
authority, neither one possessing a shred of independent authority; 
Palestine became an English colony, which England took the liberty of 
selling to the Jews so that they might establish therein a national Zionist 
homeland; Syria became a French colony; Iraq became an English colony; 
the Hijaz (the Western Province of Arabia) possessed a weak, unstable 
government dependent on charity and clinging to false treaties and 
worthless covenants; Yemen possessed an outmoded government and a 
poverty stricken populace exposed to attack anywhere and at any time; the 
remaining nations of the Arabian peninsula consisted of small emirates 
whose rulers lived under the wing of the British consuls and who fought 
one another for the crumbs falling from their tables, their breasts burning 
with mutual resentment and hatred. This was the case despite the 
reassuring promises and binding treaties drawn up by the Allies with the 
mightiest monarch of the Peninsula, King Hussein, stating that they would 
help him achieve the Arab independence and support the authority of the 
Arab Caliphate; Iran and Afghanistan possessed shaky governments beset 
by power hungry people on every side, they would be under the wing of 
one nation at one time and under that of another at other times; India was 
an English colony; Turkistan and the adjoining regions were Russian 
colonies, subjected to the bitter harshness of the Bolshevik authorities. 
Apart from these, there were also the Islamic minorities scattered across 
many countries, knowing no state to whose protection they might have 
recourse, nor any well armed government to defend their nationality, as, 
e.g., the Muslims in Ethiopia, China, the Balkans, and the lands of Central, 
South, East and West Africa. Under such conditions, Europe won in the 
political struggle, and finally accomplished her goal in dismembering the 
Islamic empire, annihilating the Islamic state and erasing it politically, 
from the list of powerful, living nations.
[26] 
Al-Banna notes that as each of these nations struggled to regain its 
freedom and the right to exist as an independent entity, concepts of 
localized nationalism arose, and many states working towards this revival 
purposely ignored the idea of unity.
[27] From that moment the Muslim   8
Brotherhood launched the struggle for the return of the Islamic empire as a 
unified state embracing the Muslims that had been scattered around the 
world, raising the banner of Islam and carrying its message.
[28] At this 
stage, the Europeans ceased to be a model. On the contrary, they were 
blamed for the ills of the Muslim ummah. 'The Europeans', Hasan Al-
Banna wrote:  
. . . worked assiduously in trying to immerse (the world) in 
materialism, with its corrupting traits and murderous germs, to 
overwhelm those Muslim lands that their hands stretched out to . . . 
they were able to alter the basic principles of government, justice, 
and education, and infuse in the most powerful Islamic countries, 
their own peculiar political, judicial, and cultural systems. They 
imported their semi-naked women into these regions, together with 
their liquors, their theatres, their dance halls, their amusement 
arcades, their stories, their newspapers, their novels, their whims, 
their silly games, and their vices. Here they allowed for crimes 
intolerable in their own countries, and beautified this tumultuous 
world to the deluded, naive eyes of wealthy Muslims and those of 
rank and authority. This was not enough for them, so they built 
schools and scientific cultural institutes, casting doubt and heresy 
within the hearts of people. They taught them how to demean 
themselves, to vilify their religion and their homeland, to detach 
themselves from their beliefs, and to regard anything Western as 
sacred, in the belief that only that which is European can be 
emulated. These schools were restricted to the upper class, the 
ruling body, the powerful and the future leaders. Those who were 
unsuccessful in such places were sent abroad to complete their 
studies. This drastic, well-organised social campaign was 
tremendously successful since it appealed to the mind. It will 
continue to exert its strong intellectual influence over a long period 
of time. Thus, it was far more dangerous than any political or 
military campaign. Some Islamic countries went overboard in their 
admiration for the European civilization and their dissatisfaction 
with the Islamic one, to the point that Turkey declared itself a non-
Islamic state, imitating the Europeans in everything that they did. 
Aman Allah Khan, King of Afghanistan, tried this, but the attempt 
cost him his throne. In Egypt the manifestations of this mimicry 
increased and became so serious that one of her intellectual leaders 
could openly say that the only path to progress was to adopt this 
civilization: good or evil, bitter or sweet, praiseworthy or 
reprehensible. From Egypt it spread with strength and speed into   9
the neighboring countries, to the extent that it reached Morocco 
and encircled the holy sanctuaries within the midst of Hijaz.
[29] 
Explaining that his movement's mission is one of reawakening and 
deliverance, Al-Banna declared that the goals of his organization were: 
1. Freeing the Islamic homeland from all foreign authority, for this 
is a natural right belonging to every human being, which only the 
unjust oppressor will deny. 
2. The establishment of an Islamic state within this homeland, 
which acts according to the precepts of Islam, applies its social 
regulations, advocates its sound principles, and broadcasts its 
mission to all of mankind.
[30]  
Al-Banna warned the Muslims, in general, and the members of his group, 
in particular: 'As long as this state does not emerge, every Muslim is 
sinning and Muslims are responsible before Allah the Almighty for their 
failure and slackness to establish it. In these bewildering circumstances, it 
is against the interests of humanity that a state advocating injustice and 
oppression should arise, while there should be no one at all working for 
the advent of a state founded on truth, justice, and peace. We want to 
accomplish these two goals in the Nile Valley and the Arab Kingdom, and 
in every land which Allah has blessed with the Islamic creed: uniting all 
the Muslims.'
[31] 
 
The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood took a special interest in stressing 
that their movement was set up in response to the downfall of the 
Khilafah. 'When the Khilafah was brought down', Mustafa Mashhoor, 
deputy leader of the Brotherhood explained: 'Imam Hasan Al-Banna rose 
up and proclaimed the restoration of the Khilafah to be a religious duty 
incumbent upon every single Muslim man and woman.'
[32] In a message 
sent to the heads of Muslim states in June 1947, Hasan Al-Banna 
demanded that they shoulder their responsibilities and undertake the task 
of serving the ummah. The task, he explained, consisted of two parts: the 
first, to rid the ummah of its political shackles so as to achieve its freedom 
and restore its lost independence and sovereignty; and the second to 
rebuild the ummah anew in order to pursue its path among nations and 
compete with others for the attainment of social perfection.
[33] Hence, 
Hasan Al-Banna's main concern was to mobilize the public against 
colonialism and its adverse effects on society. He called for the re- 
establishment of Islamic governance on three foundations: the ruler's   10
accountability to Allah and to the public, the unity of the ummah within a 
framework of brotherhood, and respect for the will of the ummah and its 
right to check its rulers who are obliged to respect its will and opinions.
[34] 
In his analysis of the causes of European progress, he prognosticated the 
eventual collapse of Western civilization due to immorality, usury and 
political divisions.  
In his message Bayn al-Ams wa'l-Yawm (Between Yesterday and Today), 
he cites (political) parties as one of the factors that would lead to European 
decline.
[35] Although he stood for parliamentary elections twice, and while 
stressing that the parliamentary and constitutional system is in essence 
compatible with the Islamic system of government, he was adamant in his 
opposition to political parties. He regarded them as a potential threat to 
Islamic unity, which he deemed was essential for the re-establishment of 
the Khilafah. 'They (political parties) are this homeland's greatest misdeed, 
the root of social corruption whose fire is scalding us. They are not 
genuine parties in the sense by which parties in any other country of the 
world are known. They are no more than a series of dissension caused by 
personal disagreements among a number of the children of this ummah. 
Whose circumstances necessitated one day that they should speak in its 
name and demand its national rights . . . There is no more room for half 
solutions and there is no escape from the inevitability of the dissolution of 
all these parties. The forces of the ummah ought to be joined in one party 
that would have to work for the restoration of its independence and 
freedom, and that would lay down the foundations for general domestic 
reform.'
[36]  Between the two World Wars, thinkers affiliated with the 
liberal trend campaigned, like their 19th-century predecessors for total 
Westernization. Embracing secularism, they called for formulating 
modern constitutions and legal systems that, just as the Europeans had 
done, exclude religion and restrict its rule to the private domain. They 
hoisted the slogan of 'separating state and religion' and blamed Islam for 
the backwardness of the Arabs.
[37] 
The abolishment of the Khilafah in 1924 aroused a debate among thinkers 
of the time over its importance. Ali Abd Ar-Raziq (1888-1966), an Al-
Azhar graduate who later studied at Oxford, contributed to the debate with 
a book that turned out to be among the most controversial works in 
modern Islamic history. Abd Ar-Raziq's theory claimed there were no 
such things as Islamic political principles. He denied the existence of a 
political order in Islam and claimed that the Prophet never established one 
and that it was not part of his mission to found a state.
[38] 
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As Arab societies responded to the challenge of colonialism and rose to 
restore their freedom and struggle for their independence, Westernized 
elites took over the leadership of national movements that originally had 
Islamic inclinations. Despotic single-party regimes or absolute monarchies 
replaced the colonial authorities in most of the Arab countries. Throughout 
the post-independence era, Islam, its culture and its heritage came under 
savage onslaught in the name of modernization. The Al-Azhar of Egypt 
was turned into a secular university, the Tunisian Az-Zaytouna Institute 
was closed down, awqaf (endowment) institutions were nationalized, 
Shari’ah courts were either dissolved or marginalized and political parties 
and groups were banned or outlawed. The Ikhwan, who had already 
established branches or strong links in many Arab and Muslim countries, 
were hit hard by Nassir in Egypt soon after he came to power in 1952. 
Following the execution of several of their leaders and the imprisonment 
of hundreds of their followers in 1954, they were driven underground. The 
challenge had once again changed shape. It was no more the challenge and 
struggle for independence and freedom, but rather the struggle to resist 
and defend the ummah against what was perceived as a pernicious 
onslaught against Islam and the cultural identity of the ummah not only by 
foreign colonial powers but also by post-independence regimes. From then 
until the early seventies, members of the Islamic movement were 
influenced mainly by the works of Mawdudi and Nadwi and by the 
writings of Sayyid Qutb. 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), who was imprisoned for ten years in 1954 and 
then executed in 1966, became the leading ideologue of the Muslim 
Brotherhood from the mid-fifties. His book Milestones, which was written 
in response to Nassir's persecution of the Ikhwan, acquired a wide 
acceptance throughout the Arab world after his execution and following 
the defeat of the Arabs in the 1967 War with Israel. In it, he put forward 
the thesis of Jahiliyyah (ignorance, barbarity or idolatry), from which 
Islam came to deliver the world.
[39] Qutb divided social systems into two 
categories: the order of Islam and the order of Jahiliyyah, which was 
decadent and ignorant, the type which had existed in Arabia before the 
Prophet Muhammad received the Word of God, when men revered not 
God but other men disguised as deities.
[40] Muslim society, according to 
him, was itself divided into two realms, that of Islam and that of 
Jahiliyyah. This was clearly expressed by Qutb in Milestones as follows: 
'Jahiliyyah is now present not only in the capitalist West and the 
Communist East, it has also infected the world of Islam. All that is around 
us is Jahiliyyah. Peoples' imaginings, their beliefs, customs, and traditions, 
the sources of their culture, their art and literature, their laws and statutes,   12
much even of what we take to be Islamic culture, Islamic authorities, 
Islamic philosophy, Islamic thought: all this too is of the making of this 
Jahiliyyah.'
[41] Drawing from the theory of Mawdudi (1903-79) that as 
Islam has reverted to a state of Jahiliyyah, true Muslims find themselves 
in a state of war against the apostates, Sayyid Qutb concluded that true 
Muslims, the tali'ah (vanguards), are and must be set apart within the 
ambient infidel society as a sort of 'counter-society'. In his trial statement, 
Sayyid Qutb declared: 'We are the ummah of the believers, living within a 
jahili society. Nothing relates us to state or to society and we owe no 
allegiance to either. As a community of believers we should see ourselves 
in a state of war with the state and the society.'
[42] 
However, as far as democracy is concerned Qutb seemed to develop his 
own theory. In this he went much farther than Mawdudi, rejecting the 
concept altogether, denouncing it as alien, incompatible and jahili. The 
term hakimiyyah (sovereignty), which Qutb constantly referred to while 
arguing against man-made political systems, was originally coined by 
Mawdudi, who used it to distinguish between Islamic and jahili (barbaric) 
societies. Mawdudi had argued that in a jahili situation, the edifice of 
politics rises on the foundations of al-hakimiyyah al-bashariyah (human 
sovereignty) whether such sovereignty rests in the hands of an individual, 
a family or a class or is the sovereignty of the public. 'Legislating in this 
kind of reign', Mawdudi explained, 'is entirely in the hands of man. All 
laws are made and replaced according to desires and to experimental 
interests. So is the case with political plans, which are only drawn or 
altered as dictated by the passion for utility and the provision of interests. 
In such a reign, no word is given precedence and no affair is awarded 
prevalence except if such were the functions of those who are most 
cunning, most resourceful and most capable of fabricating lies; those who 
have reached the pinnacle of deceit, cruelty and guilefulness; and those 
who have seized full control and are recognized as leaders in their 
community where, in their ''laws'', falsehood becomes truth just because its 
proponents have power and have the ability to terrorize, and where, in 
their courts of law, truth becomes falsehood just because it has no 
supporter or defender.'
[43] In spite of all of this, Mawdudi still believed that 
Islam, by virtue of the institution of shura, was democratic. In spite of his 
reservations about the Western liberal democratic practice, he called for a 
chance to be given to democracy, one which would allow it to adapt and 
succeed in Muslim countries.
[44] Considering the task of reforming the 
system of government and administration to be part of the Muslim faith, 
Mawdudi suggested that the means of achieving such a reform would be to 
'displace those who are corrupt and misguided from power and to replace   13
them with those who are fit and righteous.'
[45] As to how this change could 
be achieved, Mawdudi stressed: 
There is no other way in a democratic system except to participate 
in the battle of elections, that is by educating the public opinion in 
the country and changing the people's standard in electing their 
representatives. We should also reform the election mechanism 
and cleanse it from theft, deceit and forgery. By doing so, we 
would be in a position to hand power to righteous men, who are 
eager to develop the country on the pure basis of Islam.
[46] 
When asked about the flaws in liberal democracy, he explained to his 
students that notwithstanding the flaws in any particular form of 
democracy, the principle that the masses have the right to choose, and to 
bring to account and replace their government, should always prevail. 
When asked which method for running the affairs of the people is 
principally correct, Mawdudi retorted: 'Should those who are in charge of 
the affairs of the people and who run them on their behalf be appointed by 
the free will of the people so that they only administer and govern through 
consultation, and after having obtained the consent of the people, and so 
that they only remain in power so long as they enjoy the confidence of the 
public? Or should one person, or a group of persons, impose themselves 
upon the people, take charge of their affairs and run such affairs according 
to their own whims, and whose appointment or dismissal, or whose 
running of the people's affairs, are beyond the will or control of those who 
are being run by them?'
[47] 
He further explained that any flaws in democratic practice were due to 
three main reasons. The first, the assumption that the masses are the 
source of total power and absolute sovereignty, while in effect, and in any 
attempt to set up an absolute democracy in the world, the masses come 
under the control of, and suffer the hegemony, of very few individuals. 
Mawdudi suggested that Islam had a solution for this problem. 'Islam', he 
stressed, 'rectifies this flaw at the outset by imposing a siege on democracy 
derived from a basic law dictated by the Creator, Master and True 
Sovereign of this universe. This is a law that both the public and those in 
charge of administering its affairs are obliged to abide by. Thus, the 
question of absolute independence, which eventually causes democracy to 
fail, does not arise.'
[48] 
The second and third reasons, Mawdudi argued, pertain to the standard of 
education and the degree of awareness of the electorate, or what he refers   14
to as the masses. Here too, Islam provides an answer with its emphasis on 
educating the Muslims, ' . . . preparing them morally and calling on each 
of them to have a sense of responsibility'.
[49] For democracy to yield its 
fruits and proceed successfully, Mawdudi argued, that much would 
depend on the existence of a strong and vigilant public opinion. 'Such a 
public opinion', he explained, 'comes [in] to being when the community 
comprises righteous individuals who are entered in a social system that is 
established on [a] sound basis, [one] that is so vivid that evil and those 
who invite to it do not grow whereas good and those who invite to it do 
grow.'
[50] 
 
Reaffirming that Islam may provide all the necessary rules and teachings 
for such guarantees to be maintained, Mawdudi expressed his conviction 
that once these guarantees are secured the apparatus of democracy might 
function successfully. 'It might also be possible', he added, 'that whenever 
a flaw appears somewhere in this apparatus, mending it would be provided 
for by a better apparatus. The mechanism of self-correcting, together with 
progress and development, would suffice for democracy to be given an 
opportunity and be experimented with, for it is possible through 
experimentation to develop any deficient apparatus until it become[s], step 
by step, perfectly sound.'
[51] 
On the other hand, Qutb seems to have been completely opposed to any 
reconciliation with democracy. In the beginning, he was opposed to the 
idea of calling Islam democratic and even campaigned for a just 
dictatorship that would grant political liberties to the virtuous alone. In his 
Tafsir (interpretation) of Surah al-Shura (Chapter 42 of the Qur'an) he 
said: 'Democracy is, as a form of government, already bankrupt in the 
West; why should it be imported to the Middle East?'
[52] Sayyid Qutb and 
his disciples, including Sa'id Hawwa of Syria and Dr. Abdulqadir Abu 
Faris of Jordan, in their treatment of the issue of democracy took an anti-
Western position. Their discourses exhibit a lack of interest in the origin, 
nature or conditions of democracy or of its compatibility or 
incompatibility with Islamic values. In all discussions, the abstract 
democratic concept is confused with the attitude or policies of Western 
democracies toward the Arab world and Muslim issues. Their rejection of 
democracy was, understandably, a reaction. 
Sa'id Hawwa initially wrote: 'Democracy is a Greek term which signifies 
sovereignty of the people; the people being the source of legitimacy. In 
other words it is the people that legislate and rule. In Islam the people do 
not govern themselves by laws they make on their own as in democracy.   15
Rather, the people are governed by a regime and a set of laws imposed by 
God.' However, Hawwa seemed to adopt a more moderate position later in 
life, in fact just before his death, one much more reflective of the changing 
attitude of the mainstream Islamic movement. He wrote: 
We see that democracy in the Muslim World will eventually 
produce victory for Islam. Thus, we warn our brothers and 
ourselves against fighting practical democracy. In fact, we see that 
asking for more democracy is the practical way to the success of 
Islam on Islam's territory. Our enemies have realized this fact, and 
that is why they have assassinated democracy and established 
dictatorships and other alternatives. Many of the followers of Islam 
have been unable to see the positive things democracy provides to 
us; they only looked at the issue from a purely theoretical and 
ideological perspective, and failed to look at it from the 
perspective of reality, namely that the majority rules, that the 
values of such a majority dominate and that in whichever country a 
Muslim majority exists Islam will prevail. Even when the Muslims 
are a minority, democracy is mostly in their interest.
[53] 
In what amounted to a coup against his own previous stand and those of 
his mentor, Sa'id Hawwa seemed to campaign for, and encourage Islamists 
to adopt, the democratic alternative. He regretted that the Islamists have 
failed to benefit from the democratic circumstances that existed in many 
countries in the Muslim world, insisting that 'democracy in the Muslim 
World is the most appropriate climate for the success of Islam in the 
future.' Acknowledging the dilemma, he went on to say: 'The Islamists 
have fought democracy in the Muslim World because democracy in the 
Western concept has the right to make things halal (permissible) or haram 
(prohibited). It is a well-established rule in Islam that no Ijtihad (opinion) 
is allowed where a nass (sacred text) already exists. However, the problem 
here is that in the phase of conflict between Islam and other [ideologies] in 
the Islamic territory, we should know which system is better in order for 
the battle to be won by Islam.'
[54] 
Hawwa's years of exile from the early 1980s until his death in the 
Jordanian capital, Amman, in 1988 represented an important transitional 
period in the thinking of the Mashriqi (eastern) Islamic school of thought 
away from the rejectionist thought of the earlier decade. The dramatic 
events of the early 1980s in Syria, particularly the military confrontation 
between the regime and some Islamist factions, as a consequence of which 
the government declared an all-out war against all forms of Islamic   16
activity coupled with the destruction of the city of Hama and the wiping 
out of the organized edifice of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country, had 
profound and long-term effects on Islamic movements throughout the 
region. Ironically, it was the leaders and intellectuals of the severely 
bruised Syrian Islamic Movement that led the trend. The violent means of 
change had proven disastrous and the radical reform approach was a 
complete failure. 
It was thanks to Hawwa himself, and those who shared his insight, that 
this transition took place. Criticizing those Islamic writers who stood 
adamantly against the democratic process, he wrote: 'Undoubtedly, 
democracy is the most favorable environment in the Muslim world for the 
battle to be won by Islam. Nevertheless, some people have been found in 
the Muslim world to fight democracy. The alternative has been military 
dictatorships and [single] party dictatorships that kept all the ills and 
prejudices of the Western democracy against Islam and the Islamists and 
denied Islam and the Islamists the freedom of passage. Democracy, 
wherever it exists in the Muslim world, means that eventually Islam and 
the Islamists will win and achieve their objective[s].'
[55] Then as if 
reminding his readers, who at the time were mostly members and 
supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in the countries of the Middle East, 
Hawwa hailed the decision once made by the founder of the movement, 
Hasan Al-Banna, to participate in parliamentary elections. This was, as 
admitted by many pro-democracy Islamists, a very significant event in the 
history of the Islamic movement that for much of the 1960s and the 1970s 
nobody seemed, or probably wanted, to remember. 
Hawwa wrote: 'Al-Banna was wise when he wanted to participate in the 
parliamentary life, and Al-Hudaybi
[56] was wise when he called for the 
revival of the parliamentary life in Egypt.' Then as if to distinguish 
between two different trends within the ranks of Islamism, Hawwa 
declared: 'Participating in the elections to benefit from the democratic life 
has become a common denominator among the genuine Islamic 
movements, and thus we ought to be brave and frank in declaring that we 
do not fear [the emergence of] democracy in the Muslim world but fear for 
it.'
[57] Hawwa went so far as to remind the Islamists that they would be 
committing suicide by rejecting democracy: 'Because they fought 
democracy and viewed it through its [literal] meaning rather than its 
implications, the Islamists have killed themselves. Consequently, they 
have been governed by the worst regimes, that have imposed on them 
what they had feared from democracy; they have been denied the freedom 
democracy grants to them.' Then he asked: 'How could the Islamists fear   17
democracy, the fear of which only leads to usurping them their freedom 
and to the rule of the minority? They should instead fear for democracy. 
The human experience has thus far shown that there can be no alternative 
to democracy other than revolutions, minority conspiracies and violence. 
All of this is a much greater risk than giving everybody the freedom to 
choose so that the majority elects those whom it deems fit and capable.'
[58] 
It is, however, clear that Hawwa did not think of democracy as an end in 
itself, but as a means to what he believed to be the noblest end, namely the 
implementation of Islam. 'Experience has proven that, in the Islamic 
ummah, democracy is the lesser of the two evils and the more moderate of 
the two damages prior to reaching the state of Islamic government.'
[59] 
In the meantime, a different school of thought was developing in the Arab 
Maghreb drawing its inspiration from the 19th-century reform movement 
of Khairuddin at-Tunisi and the ideas of 'Abduh (who had twice visited 
Tunis and had a number of associates there),
[60] Bin Badis, Ath-Tha'alibi, 
Al-Taher al-Haddad, 'Allal Al-Fasi and others. Malik Bennabi, however, is 
credited with having laid the foundations of this modern Maghreb school 
of thought. An Algerian thinker of French culture, Bennabi (1905-73) 
believed that the coming of Europe had enabled the Muslims to escape 
from their decadence - caused by the emergence of a type of mind 
incapable of thought and afflicted with moral paralysis - by breaking up 
their rigid social order and freeing them from belief in occult forces and 
fantasies.
[61] From the early 1950s until his death, he wrote and lectured on 
what he believed to be the grand issues: namely, civilization, culture, 
concepts, Orientalism and democracy.
[62] In a lecture entitled 'Democracy 
in Islam' delivered in French at the Maghreb Students Club in 1960 - 
attended then by Rachid Al-Ghannouchi and later on co-translated into 
Arabic by him - Bennabi attempted to answer the question 'Is there 
democracy in Islam?' He pointed out that defining the concepts of 'Islam' 
and 'democracy' in a conventional manner would lead to the conclusion 
that, with respect to time and location, the connection between the two is 
non-existent. He suggested that deconstructing the concepts in isolation 
from their historical connotations and re-defining democracy in its 
broadest terms, without linguistic derivatives and free from any 
ideological implications, would lead to a different conclusion. 
'Democracy', he said, 'ought to be looked at from three angles: democracy 
as a sentiment toward the ego, democracy as a sentiment toward the other, 
and democracy as the combination of the socio-political conditions 
necessary for the formation and development of such sentiments in the 
individual.' He went on to say: 'Contrary to the depiction of the romantic   18
philosophy of the era of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, these conditions are not 
created by nature, nor are they the requisites of natural law, but are the 
upshot of a specific culture, the crowning of the progress of the humanities 
and a new appraisal of the value of man; his appraisal of himself and his 
appraisal of others. Thus, the democratic sentiment is the product of this 
progress over the centuries and of this twin appreciation of the value of 
man.' 
 
Citing the French historian Guizot, in his book Europe from the End of the 
Roman Empire to the French Revolution, Bennabi stressed that various 
stages of progress led to the emergence of democracy in Europe and to the 
growth of the democratic sentiment in the European countries. He said: 
'The great historian explains to us how remote and simple the origins of 
Western democracy had been before the democratic sentiment slowly 
formed prior to bursting with the declaration of human rights and citizen 
rights; the declaration which expressed the new appraisal of man and the 
legendary and political crowning of the French Revolution. Thus, the 
European democratic sentiment began to express itself - though not yet 
ridden of the obscurity that accompanies an object while in the state of 
making or evolving - through the two grand historical movements, the 
movement of reform and the movement of renaissance.' Bennabi considers 
the two movements to be the first expression of the value of the European 
human in the domain of the soul and in the domain of the mind. He 
stresses that this is the essence of the Western democratic sentiment when 
ridden of the fetters of history and politics - since the obscurity is caused 
by a package composed of phenomena and characteristics peculiar to 
Western history and which are not found in the history of other races and 
peoples - and when things are expressed in the terms of psychology and 
sociology. In other words, the democratic sentiment in Europe was, 
according to Bennabi, the product and natural outcome of the reform and 
renaissance movements. 'This', he stresses, 'is its correct historical 
meaning, and therefore it cannot simply be severed from the history of 
Europe so as to be applied to other nations.' However, he reiterates that 
whether in Europe or anywhere else, the general rule with regard to the 
nature of the democratic sentiment is that it is the outcome of a specific 
social continuity. 'In psychological terms', he adds, 'it is the middle 
position between two ends that are opposed to each other; the end that 
expresses the psyche of the oppressed slave on the one hand and the end 
that expresses the psyche of the oppressive master on the other. The free 
man, or the new man, in whom the values and conditions of democracy 
are embodied is the positive co-ordinate that is the sum of two negatives   19
that individually negate all such values and conditions: the negative of 
servitude and the negative of enslavement.'
[63] 
As for the question of the existence of democracy within Islam, Bennabi 
argues that this is dependent on the provision of what he earlier refers to as 
the general conditions of the democratic sentiment. He then puts forward a 
set of questions: Does Islam provide and guarantee these objective and 
subjective conditions, in the sense that it creates a sentiment toward the 
'ego' and toward the 'other' that is compatible with the democratic 
sentiment? And does it create the appropriate social circumstances for the 
development of such a sentiment? Does Islam truly reduce the quantity 
and intensity of the negative motives and of the anti-democratic tendencies 
that characterize the conduct of the oppressed and the conduct of the 
oppressor? He suggests that any project aimed at founding a democracy 
should be considered an educational enterprise for the whole community, 
administered through the implementation of a comprehensive curriculum 
that encompasses psychological, ethical, social and political aspects. 
'Democracy', he asserts, 'is not - as is superficially understood by the 
common usage of its etymology - a mere political process; a process 
whereby powers are handed over to the masses . . . But is the generation of 
a sentiment, and of objective and subjective responses and standards, that 
collectively lay the foundations upon which democracy, prior to being 
stated in any constitution, stands in the conscience of the people. The 
constitution is usually nothing but the formal outcome of the democratic 
enterprise once transformed into a political reality indicated by a text that 
is inspired by customs and traditions, and dictated by a sentiment 
generated in a given circumstance. Such a text will have no meaning if not 
preceded by the customs and traditions that inspire it, or in other words the 
historical justifications that necessitate it.' He then warns that the answer 
to the question 'Is there democracy within Islam?' is not necessarily 
pertinent to a fiqh (jurisprudence) rule deduced from the Sunnah or the 
Qur'an, but is one which is related to the essence of Islam as a whole. 'In 
this sense', he argues, 'Islam should be viewed not as a constitution that 
proclaims the sovereignty of a given community, or that states the rights 
or liberties of a certain people, but as a democratic enterprise that is the 
product of an exercise, through which the position of a Muslim vis-à-vis 
his or her encompassing society is defined, along the path toward 
accomplishing democratic values and norms provided a Muslim's 
temporal activity is tied to the general principles endorsed by Islam in the 
form of a seed sown in the Islamic conscience, and in the form of a 
general sentiment, and of motives, that constitute the Islamic equilibrium 
within every member of the community.'
[64]   20
Speaking of models of democracy - 'Western' in Europe, 'popular' in the 
East and 'new' in China - that differ from one another in the way they 
express their new symbolic evaluation of man, Bennabi sees that an 
Islamic model of democracy is attainable. Whereas in the other models the 
main objective is to endow man with political rights, enjoyed by the 
'citizen' in Western countries, or social securities, enjoyed by the 'comrade' 
in Eastern countries, 'Islam', is distinguishable, according to Bennabi, 
because it 'endows man with a value that surpasses every political or 
social value'. He explains that the declaration in the Qur'anic verse 70 of 
Chapter 17, (We have honored the children of Adam), endows man with 
more than just rights or securities. 'This verse was revealed as if to lay the 
foundations for a democratic model that is above every other model, 
where the divine element within man is taken into consideration and not 
just the human or social aspects as in the other models. Thus, a kind of 
sanctity is endowed upon man raising his value above whatever value 
other models give to him.'
[65] 
However, Bennabi is keen to distinguish between what Islam has the 
potential to offer and the prevalent state of the Muslims. He concludes that 
democracy exists within Islam, not during the era when Islamic traditions 
petrify and lose their brilliancy such as nowadays, but during the era of 
their making and when society is developing, such as during the first 40 
years of Islamic history.
[66] 
Bennabi's analysis was revolutionary during his time, when Islamists in 
much of the Arab world, especially in the Middle East, were influenced by 
Qutb's thoughts and made an enemy out of democracy without ever 
understanding it. It was primarily thanks to his disciples such as Rachid 
Ghannouchi and other North African thinkers that mainstream Islamic 
movements gradually, though sometimes reluctantly, relinquished old 
positions on this matter. Malik Bennabi, who according to Ghannouchi, 
'undoubtedly represents an element of the Islamic culture of rationalism 
and particularly a revival of Ibn Khaldun's historical culture of 
rationalism', had a profound influence on the Tunisian Islamic group. The 
two men's first encounter came when, on his way back from Paris to 
Tunis, Ghannouchi traveled by land through Spain, Morocco and Algeria 
where he visited Bennabi before entering Tunisia. He had read his books 
in Damascus when he, as he put it, returned to Islam.
[67] Having read 
Sayyid Qutb during his student years in Syria and France, and having been 
greatly influenced by his thoughts during that initial period of self- 
searching, he listened attentively to Bennabi as he strongly criticized Qutb. 
The latter had actually referred to Bennabi in one of his writings without   21
mentioning his name: 'An Algerian writer who writes on Islam believes 
that Islam is one thing and civilization is another.' Bennabi was seemingly 
offended by Qutb's remark that he believed was demeaning. After 
listening to the critique, Ghannouchi concluded that Bennabi had deeper 
knowledge and a better understanding of civilization than Qutb. Bennabi 
believed that 'whereas civilization is the transformation of any good idea 
into a reality, Islam is a set of guidelines, a way of life, or a project, that 
creates a civilization only when put into practice; when its adherents carry 
it and move through the world positively influencing man, material and 
time. Therefore, a Muslim may be uncivilized just as a non-Muslim may 
be civilized.'
[68] On the other hand, Qutb insisted that civility is a synonym 
of Islam; that a Muslim is civilized and a non-Muslim is not. 'This belief', 
Ghannouchi comments, 'would inevitably lead to Takfir' (that is charging 
someone with unbelief), and goes on to say, 'Qutb seemed to have 
borrowed the belief of the Al-Khawarij that a person is not a Muslim 
unless he or she is sinless and applied it to the question of civility; that is a 
person is not a Muslim unless he is perfectly civilized, and therefore all 
those backward Muslims are infidels!'
[69] 
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